That pretty much guts the moral argument for this technique even without all the bizarre consequences it entails. This is a nice, compact view, but it does not do justice to the issue. What benefit did people ever receive from feeling the pain of the surgical knife? I am a computer professional, musician and philosopher, in no particular order. This is not a Cartesian dualism but a point about the structure of thought. Anyone who wishes to comment on this or any other post is strongly encouraged to do so.
Of particular concern are the specialty foods that require the mistreatment of animals through extraordinarily strict confinement. Once again, that is not really relevant to the point of the example. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology Series, Vol. Phillip Brey lists four types of function creep: database widening, purpose widening, user shifts, and domain shifts. But eliminating the pain of being shot with a bullet in a war does not typically advance the personal agenda of the one whose pain is eliminated.
Brown gives no indication of what he means by such qualities, but it cannot be things like mental or emotional states, because to assume those are non-physical would surely beg the question about consciousness. If we could put them under an electron microscope we would not find out what we want to know about them. Or we can continue building the pressure for the abusive industries and individuals to change their practice. Diets of grain, injections of hormones and antibiotics, all sorts of practices that create internal conditions the animal cannot possibly avoid even with all the wonders of modern neuroscience: how is saving the harm-avoidance instinct supposed to help in the least with these? So what does that show? In any case, kudos to Dr. Nothing about what I can or can't conceive today depends on what science discovers tomorrow.
This can occur through physical access to computers or through remote access by hackers. It stands to reason that some stimulation occurs when anything like perception, recognition, concentration, etc. The more capabilities we acquire with this technology, the more we can obtain designer creatures that have just those qualities we want them to have and lack just the ones we want them to lack. Perhaps in Churchand's utopia we can replace Swann's Way with some mathematical specifications of its underlying neural activity without any particular loss, but I am not holding my breath. Let it be granted, then, that the zombie argument demonstrates the conceivability of zombies.
People are known to suffer a lot from bullet wounds, flying shrapnel and incendiary devices, after all. Spray 'em with the gas, then spray them with bullets and feel much better about it. Nor consciousness, if you proceed in that manner. We may not know that identity now, but when we do we will realize that zombies - physical duplicates of ourselves but without consciousness - never really were conceivable in the first place. One gets rid of problems also by saying that god established an original harmony of thought and matter.
There may be some wave oscillations in the brain that correspond to conscious states, but they are not those conscious states. For instance, video surveillance may become common in large cities and then migrate to small towns. Even adding the observation that one gets rid of philosophical problems this way does not establish it as a viable position. Or at least, the meat. Neuroscience isn't going to answer free-standing philosophical problems; but that doesn't mean we should react to the attempt by holding those problems up out of reach. Not that I've been any less pissed off at watching the philosophers of mind, and many others, become shameless sycophants of neurobiologists, philosophical thought pander to laboratory experiments, and philosophical nihilism creep in on the hind paws of physicalism.
Database widening occurs when data from other databases are added to an existing database. Why can't I see the zombie's shape? Contact me at tony alt 1 at gmail no spaces, add the extension. I do, however, want to briefly address something I alluded to earlier, closely related to the second b of these points. Maybe someone should do some philosophical work on this topic. If shombies are conceivable, then dualists are at best guilty of rejecting the principle of inference to the simplest explanation that accounts for all the known facts. Similar arguments could be brought for memory, imagination, and other components of consciousness.
For the first question one should have is: Doesn't this somehow give moral legitimacy to war, such that even wars of aggression could be fought without the cost in human suffering that is one of the great historical motivations to stop wars from happening? And our perceiving them as being similar to us in these ways may be nothing more than a projection. Undesired collection of personal data is becoming a bigger concern. Come to think of it, the sponsors of pain-free livestock might just be consistent enough to think it's a perfectly reasonable option today. No, emphatically not; we may not have had a thought about the creature's suffering, but found it repugnant nonetheless. Most opponents of the materialist view rely heavily on one or more intuition pumps that allegedly bring out a gap between the knowledge and understanding of physical facts and an explanation of consciousness.